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Abstract 
The regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity sector within a cap-and-trade 
system poses significant policy questions about how to allocate tradable emission allowances. Allocation 
conveys tremendous value and can have efficiency consequences. This research uses simulation modeling 
for the electricity sector to examine different approaches to allocation under a cap-and-trade program in 
California. The decision affects prices and other aspects of the electricity sector, as well as implications 
for the overall cost of climate policy. An important issue is the opportunity for emission reductions in 
California to be offset by emission increases in neighboring regions that supply electricity to the state. 
The amount of emission leakage (i.e. an increase in CO2 emissions outside of California as a result of the 
program) varies with the regulatory design of the program. 
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Allowance Allocation in a CO2 Emissions Cap-and-Trade Program 
for the Electricity Sector in California 
Karen Palmer, Dallas Burtraw, and Anthony Paul ∗ 
Executive Summary 
In 2006, California adopted the California Global Warming Solutions Act (Assembly Bill 
32), which requires the state to reduce aggregate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 1990 levels 
by 2020. In December 2008, the California Air Resources Board released a proposed framework 
for its plan that outlines important roles for a collection of regulations, voluntary measures, and 
other policies to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. The plan also proposes a role for cap 
and trade, which refers to the introduction of a limit (cap) on aggregate GHG emissions, coupled 
with the opportunity for emitters to buy, sell, or bank the opportunity to emit up to the level of 
the cap. The details of the cap-and-trade program and exactly how it will relate to the other 
measures and policies is a decision that will be made in the next couple of years.  
In California, a cap and trade program implemented economywide would be likely to 
cover roughly 83 percent of emissions. Other applications of cap and trade for CO2 have covered 
only some sectors. For example, only the electricity sector is covered in the case of the northeast 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which launched a cap-and-trade program in January 
2009 that affects 10 states. This research addresses the options for regulation of California’s 
electricity sector within the context of an economywide cap-and-trade program in the state, and 
potentially the western region or the nation. A simulation model of the national electricity 
markets is used to look at how different approaches to allocating CO2 allowances within the 
electricity sector affect the performance of the regional electricity markets and of the cap-and-
trade program. 
                                                 
∗ The authors are senior fellow, senior fellow, and program fellow, respectively, at Resources for the Future. This 
research was supported by The Energy Foundation and the California Energy Commission PIER grant # MEX-07-
02, with supplemental funding from The Simons Foundation, Resources for the Future and the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency EPA National Center for Environmental Research (NCER) STAR Program (EPA Agreement 
Number R83183601). The research does not represent the views of these organizations. We are indebted to staff at 
the California Public Utility Commission. The manuscript benefited from technical assistance from Erica Myers, Ina 
Clark, Richard Sweeney and Maura Allaire, and comments from Nancy Ryan, Ed Vine, five anonymous reviewers 
and participants in the Fifth Annual California Climate Change Conference, September 2008. 
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One issue the study examines is emissions leakage (i.e., an increase in emissions from 
sources outside of California that offset some of the reductions from sources in the state). One 
approach to account for emissions associated with generation out-of-state is called the “first 
deliverer approach,” which imposes an obligation to comply within the cap-and-trade program 
upon the financial entity that brings power into the California electricity grid. The research also 
considers how expanding the geographic scope of a cap-and-trade program in the region to 
address leakage affects the cost of controlling CO2 emissions and the impact of a cap-and-trade 
program on electricity consumers both in California and beyond. In addition, the paper addresses 
the crucial question of the initial distribution, or allocation, of emissions allowances. Two 
approaches are considered: an auction (we do not address how revenues from an auction might 
be spent), and free allocation to local distribution companies, which are the companies that 
provide retail services to customers. The latter approach is termed “load-based allocation.”  
The most important findings of this study are listed below: 
•  An allowance auction coupled with regulations that cover emissions from out of state that 
are imposed of the first deliverer of power into the state could cap CO2 emissions from 
electricity consumption in California at 30 percent below business-as-usual levels in 2020 
with roughly an 11 percent increase in electricity price in California.  
•  About half of that price increase would be mitigated if allowances are allocated to local 
distribution companies (i.e., investor-owned and municipal utilities involved in the 
delivery of electricity to consumers within a specific geographic area) in California on 
the basis of population (load-based allocation). The lower electricity price effect with 
load-based allocation comes at a cost. This allocation approach would yield a CO2 
allowance price in 2020 that is more than 100 percent higher than the allowance price 
resulting under an auction. With a smaller increase in electricity price, electricity 
consumers would have a weaker incentive to conserve electricity, which means that there 
will be more demand for the fixed quantity of emission allowances, thus driving up their 
price.  
•  Under an economywide CO2 cap-and-trade program with load-based allocation in the 
electricity sector, the higher allowance price effect that results compared to an auction 
has implications for other parts of the California economy. The relatively lower 
electricity price and associated higher electricity demand imply that fewer emission 
reductions would be achieved within the electricity sector than would occur with an 
allowance auction, and consistent with the higher overall allowance price, more would be 
required from other sectors of the California economy.  Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
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•  With an allowance auction, roughly one-quarter of the emission reductions targeted for 
2020 in a CO2 cap-and-trade policy in the California electricity market would be lost 
through emissions leakage. Under a load-based approach to allocation, the percentage of 
emissions reductions lost through emissions leakage would rise to 45 percent. If the state 
were to ignore emissions associated with imported power (an approach that would not 
comply with AB32), emissions leakage would approach 100 percent. 
•  Imposing a western regional CO2 emissions cap on the electricity sector that delivers 
similarly ambitious percentage reductions in emissions throughout the region as modeled 
in the California-only policy would address the emissions leakage problem. It would do 
so at lower cost to California electricity consumers and at a substantially lower marginal 
cost of CO2 emissions reduction than a cap-and-trade policy limited to California. 
Allocating allowances to local distribution companies in the broader western region will 
reduce the size of the increase in electricity price, but will increase allowance price by 
nearly 30 percent compared to an auction.  
In summary, this analysis suggests that the most cost-effective approach to implementing 
a cap-and-trade program in the electricity sector would be to use a first deliverer for the point of 
compliance and to use an auction for the allocation of emission allowances. The effectiveness of 
the program will be greatly enhanced if it involves states throughout the western region. Finally, 
we note that California’s decision about the architecture of AB 32 could play an important role in 




In 2006, California adopted the California Global Warming Solutions Act (Assembly Bill 
32), which requires the state to reduce aggregate greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 
2020. The act charges the California Air Resources Board (ARB) to develop a comprehensive 
plan for implementation by January 1, 2009. In December 2008, the ARB proposed a framework 
for its plan that outlines important roles for both a cap-and-trade approach and a collection of 
regulations, voluntary measures and other policies to reduce CO2 emissions. The details of the 
cap-and-trade program and exactly how it will relate to the other measures and policies is a 
decision that will be made in the next couple of years.  
One of the challenges California faces is how to regulate the electricity sector. Electricity 
consumption (including emissions associated with imported power) is estimated to account for 
23.5 percent of the greenhouse gases in the state, including about 27.7 percent of the carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions (California Market Advisory Committee 2007). This is a low 
percentage compared with the rest of the country, where electricity consumption accounts for 
about 33 percent of greenhouse gases and about 40 percent of CO2 emissions.1 The largest 
category of greenhouse gas emissions in California is transportation, which accounts for about 
40.4 percent. Nonetheless, the electricity sector remains very important to the design of the 
California trading program.  
First, the electricity sector is typically identified as the source of most potential 
greenhouse gas reductions in the near term, at least at the national level, where modeling 
indicates that the electricity sector will account for between two-thirds and three-quarters of 
emissions reductions in the next two decades under national policy (U.S.EIA 2007b; Pizer et al. 
2006). In California, however, there may be fewer low-cost opportunities for emission reductions 
in the electricity sector because little electricity is generated using coal, limiting the potential 
emissions reductions from fuel switching away from coal. Second, experience with cap-and-
trade programs elsewhere has been largely in the electricity sector. Previous programs, including 
                                                 
1 U.S. electricity emissions are about 9 percent of total CO2 emissions worldwide. The Market Advisory Committee 
(2007, p. 41) reports that the carbon intensity of electricity generation in California in 2004 was 700 pounds of CO2 
per MWh. Accounting for imported power brings the average emissions intensity of electricity consumed in the state 
to 930 pounds per MWh. Across the nation, the average emission intensity of electricity generation is 1,176 pounds 
per MWh. Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
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the sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) trading programs in the United States have 
focused primarily on electricity generators and the Emission Trading Scheme for CO2 in the 
European Union focuses exclusively on point sources, the majority of which are also electricity 
generators. The electricity sector has been successful as a testing ground for this type of 
regulation. 
Figure 1. California Emissions of Greenhouse Gases, 2004 
 
Source: California Market Advisory Committee 2007. 
California’s own generation resources are low emitting, while its imported power is 
relatively high emitting. About 80 percent of the electricity consumed in the state is generated in 
the state, but as illustrated in Figure 1, about 52 percent of the greenhouse gas emissions 
associated with electricity consumption comes from outside the state (CEC 2006).2 Attempts to 
regulate only in-state sources would be expensive per ton of emissions reduction compared with 
the opportunities to reduce emissions on a broader scale. Given the open transmission system, 
attempts to regulate only in-state sources also would lead to more imported power, with an 
                                                 
2 This measure is somewhat ambiguous because it is based on financial contracts with out-of-state generators. To 
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associated increase in out-of-state emissions. The act anticipated this issue by requiring that the 
state’s greenhouse gas reduction target include the out-of-state emissions associated with 
California electricity consumption.  
This research addresses options for the regulation of California’s electricity sector within 
the context of an economywide cap-and-trade program in the state, and potentially for the nation. 
A simulation model of the national electricity markets is used to look at how different 
approaches to allocating CO2 allowances3 within the electricity sector affect the performance of 
the regional electricity markets and of the cap-and-trade program. The main options for 
allocation that are addressed include an auction and free allocation to local distribution 
companies (LDCs) that are responsible for the distribution of power to retail customers.4  For 
most customers the LDC and the load serving entity (LSE) are one in the same, but they need not 
be if a customer is purchasing electricity from an entity other than its local utility in which case 
that other entity is the LSE and the LDC is still the one that ships electricity to your door. 
 
















Crucial Architecture for CO2:
Distinguish the Point of Regulation (Compliance)
from the Point of Allocation
 
                                                 
3 An allowance is an intangible property right that enables the emissions of one unit of a regulated air pollutant. A 
regulated entity must surrender allowances to cover all of its emissions during a compliance period. 
4 Other options for allocation that are available include free allocation to generators or to first deliverers on the basis 
of historic sales (known as historic allocation or on the basis of sales in a more recent year with the basis of 
allocation being updated over time (known as updating allocation).  Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
4 
As Figure 2 illustrates, the point of allocation and the point of compliance need not be the 
same. The term allocation implies free initial distribution of emission allowances, but in fact 
there may be no free allocation at all. A substantial literature has advocated for the use of an 
auction rather than free allocation for distributing allowances.5 This is the approach being used 
for nearly 90 percent of the allowances being distributed by the 10-state northeast Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative that took effect in January 2009.6 An auction approach also was the 
approach highlighted as preferable, perhaps after a transition period, by the California Market 
Advisory Committee. Discussions of allowance allocation in California also have included the 
possibility of allocating allowances for free to local distribution companies, which would transfer 
a substantial amount of the allowance value created by the program to electricity consumers. 
In this study, the modeling analysis of a California-only cap-and-trade program for CO2 
applied to first-deliverers in the California electricity market suggests that such a program would 
result in leakage (i.e., an increase in CO2 emissions outside of California in response to the 
program) of 26 percent of the emissions reductions achieved under the program if allowances 
were distributed through an auction, and 45 percent if allowances were allocated for free to local 
distribution companies. Compared to an auction, allocating allowances to local distribution 
companies on the basis of population in the service territory would reduce the effect of a cap-
and-trade policy on average electricity price in California by roughly half. However, the smaller 
price effect would come at a cost of a 100 percent increase in allowance prices in 2020. In an 
economywide program, this would translate into the need to achieve greater reductions outside 
the electricity sector, at higher cost.  
Expanding the geographic scope of the program to encompass all the western states 
substantially addresses the leakage concern and lowers both the marginal cost of CO2 emission 
reductions, as reflected in the allowance price, and the effect of the policy on electricity price in 
California. Allocating allowances to local distribution companies in the broader western region 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Parry (1997) and Goulder et al. (1999), who demonstrate that an auction with revenue recycling 
aimed at the reduction of other taxes dramatically lowers the social cost of the policy. Burtraw et al. (2001) 
demonstrate that an auction also has the property of providing more efficient pricing in regulated regions of the 
country. Ruth et al. (2008) demonstrate that an auction can provide revenues that reinforce program goals by 
funding investments in energy efficiency and thereby lower the cost of the program for consumers.  
6 The Initiative’s Memorandum of Understanding specified that all states should allocate at least 25 percent of the 
emissions allowances created by a cap-and-trade program to consumer benefit and strategic energy initiatives. An 
auction of allowances is the most likely way to implement this policy. Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
5 
will reduce the size of the increase in electricity price, but will increase allowance price by 
nearly 30 percent compared to an auction. 
The next section provides background for regulation of CO2 in the California electricity 
sector. Section 3 introduces the modeling scenarios and Section 4 presents analysis. Section 5 
provides concluding observations.  
2. Regulating CO2 in California’s Electricity Sector 
One month after the passage of the California Global Warming Solutions Act, Governor 
Schwarzenegger issued an executive order creating the Market Advisory Committee to advise 
the California Air Resources Board (ARB) on developing a plan for a cap-and-trade program. 
One alternative identified by the committee was an upstream approach that would regulate 
emissions at the point where fossil fuels enter the economy. Implementation at this point could 
achieve coverage of 83 percent of the greenhouse gas emissions in the state by regulating 150 
facilities, plus regulation of entities that bring electric power into the state.7  
However, the approach that received the most attention, partly based on precedent in 
other trading programs, was midstream regulation. As illustrated by Figure 2, this approach 
would regulate midway in the fuel cycle between the introduction of fossil fuels into the 
economy and their end use. This approach could achieve a comparable coverage of 83 percent of 
the state’s emissions by regulating 490 facilities, assuming that transportation fuels would be 
regulated at the refinery.  
An important question that has been addressed by the CPUC and CEC is how the 
regulation would be implemented in the electricity sector. In the winter of 2008, these agencies 
recommended that ARB should pursue the first-deliverer approach, originally proposed as the 
so-called first-seller approach by the Market Advisory Committee (2007). It would place a legal 
obligation for reporting and compliance on the first deliverer of power, which is the owner, 
operator, or power marketer for a generation facility located in the state, or the party bringing 
power onto the electricity grid for power generated out of state. Compliance would be required 
for power placed into the transmission system from that facility. For in-state sources, a first-
deliverer approach would look the same as the source-based system that characterizes previous 
                                                 
7 This approach would require monitoring and reporting for all fossil fuels produced in or imported into California, 
as well as fuel exports. This includes about 100 business entities that take delivery of gas via a pipeline. Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
6 
trading programs, such as the SO2 trading program, in which compliance is required at the point 
of combustion—that is, where emissions are released into the atmosphere.  
The first deliverer approach is an imperfect tool for dealing with imported power. It is 
worth emphasizing that if California’s program is integrated into the efforts of the seven states 
and three Canadian provinces participating in the Western Climate Initiative and if a cap-and-
trade program is implemented in this broader geographic region, the issue of electricity imports 
will be much reduced.  
Nonetheless, even with a first deliverer approach there is the possibility for contract 
shuffling, which is the opportunity for wholesalers of out-of-state power to shift the assignment 
of existing sources with relatively low emissions rates to serve California while assigning higher-
emitting sources to serve other load centers outside California. According to Bushnell (2007) and 
Fowlie (2007), contract shuffling could result in no real change in the resource mix and therefore 
no real change in CO2 emissions throughout the western electricity grid under AB32 even under 
nominal compliance with AB32 and “reductions” from baseline emissions levels. 
There is reason to believe that the opportunities for contract shuffling may be more 
limited than identified by Bushnell and Fowlie. First, emissions trading would occur in a 
regulatory context that already has introduced significant regulations and initiatives aimed at 
reducing CO2 emissions associated with electricity consumption. These include the CPUC’s 
loading order rule adopted in May 2003 that establishes the priorities for energy procurement for 
IOUs. 8 The PUC’s procurement rule and SB 1368 prohibit long-term contracts with facilities 
that do not meet a GHG emissions standard, which is set equal to an efficient natural gas 
combined cycle facility. In addition, they do not model the first deliverer approach. The 
approach would rely on the California Climate Action Registry’s (CCAR) Power/Utility 
Reporting Protocol, which assigns emissions intensity to imported power. According to a recent 
study by the California Energy Commission (Alvarado and Griffin 2007), relying on the CCAR 
protocol allows for a precise identification of the power plant and associated emissions for about 
                                                 
8 In December 2004, the CPUC adopted a CO2 cost adder of $8 to $25 per ton to be added into system dispatch, and 
in October 2005, it issued a policy statement on a greenhouse gas performance standard.  Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
7 
56 percent of imported power.9 The remainder would have to be assigned an emission intensity 
based on other information, such as the average emission intensity for the control region from 
which the power is delivered into California based on information from the electronic North 
American Electric Reliability Council E-tag documents.10 This is the information that regulators 
would use to make an assignment of out-of-state emissions to the use of electricity in California. 
This information would be used to assess the compliance responsibility of the party listed on the 
E-tag document—that is, the party that is the first deliverer of imported power to the electricity 
grid.  
3. Simulation Analysis of CO2 Emissions Cap and Trade for  
Electricity in California 
The way in which emissions allowances are allocated and the geographic region that is 
regulated are expected to yield differences in allowance and electricity prices, new investments 
in California generators, and the mix of generation used to supply power in California. These 
decisions could also affect the amount of electricity imported into California and the mix of 
generation used in the remaining western states. In addition, policy design will affect the level of 
CO2 emissions leakage into surrounding states. A simulation exercise is used to look at the 
effects of different approaches to a CO2 cap-and-trade program for electricity in California on 
allowance markets and state and regional electricity markets. 
                                                 
9 Confidence in the estimate may be undermined by the evolution of contracting relationships over time. If a 
financial penalty is placed on high-emission import contracts, over time as contracts expire and are renewed, they 
will be replaced with new contracts with cleaner sources. This turnover of contracts could erode the effectiveness of 
the program because the new contracts do not necessarily imply there will be any different investment or operation 
of the electricity system than would occur in the absence of the program. Instead, the same generation capability 
could be assigned differently. On the other hand, California’s regulatory efforts under AB 32 and the procurement 
rule precluding new long-term contracts with high-emitting facilities affect the investment climate in the power 
sector and raise the cost of capital for high-emitting projects, thereby affecting generation options over time, and 
these policies are expected to have a real effect on the nature of future investment. As California’s efforts to 
facilitate an agreement with the multi-state Western Climate Initiative proceed, this effect should be more 
pronounced. 
10 E-tags are electronic documents used to track the transmission of electricity, so that sources of grid congestion 
can be more easily identified and mitigated. In addition to identifying the parties with financial ownership of the 
power, the E-tag identifies the source and destination control region. Parties identified on the E-tags are licensed to 
schedule power into the transmission grid. Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
8 
3.1 Description of RFF’s Haiku Model 
The electricity supply and market analysis relies on a detailed simulation model of the 
electricity sector known as the Haiku Electricity Market Model (Haiku), which is maintained by 
Resources for the Future (Paul et al. 2009). Haiku is a deterministic, highly parameterized model 
that calculates information similar to the National Energy Modeling System used by the Energy 
Information Administration (U.S. EIA 2003)., and the Integrated Planning Model developed by 
ICF Consulting and used by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA 2006). As a 
deterministic model, Haiku does not include explicit treatment of uncertainty. It includes 
parameters representing costs, capacity, emissions characteristics and other features of electricity 
supply and demand. The data sources for the different categories of Haiku parameters are listed 
in Table 1. Figure 3 shows the inputs to and outputs from the Haiku model.  
The Haiku model simulates equilibrium in regional electricity markets and interregional 
electricity trade. The model also identifies emission control technology choices for SO2, NOx, 
and mercury at different types of generators. The composition of electricity supply is calculated 
using a fully integrated algorithm for capacity investment and retirement, coupled with system 
operation in temporally and geographically linked electricity markets. The model solves for 
electricity price levels and production levels that equate demand and supply in 21 Haiku market 
regions (HMRs) for the continental United States. Each of the 21 HMRs is classified by its 
electricity pricing regime as having either market-based electricity pricing (i.e., electricity prices 
determined by the cost of producing a kilowatt hour for the marginal generator) or regulated 
pricing (i.e. the average cost of supplying electricity for all generators supplying the market), as 
shown in Figure 4.  
Electricity markets are assumed to maintain their current regulatory status throughout the 
modeling horizon; that is, regions that have already moved to market-based pricing of generation 
continue that practice, and those that have not made that move remain regulated. The price of 
electricity to consumers does not vary by time of day in any region, though all customers in 
competitive regions face prices that vary from season to season11. Electricity demand is sensitive 
                                                 
11 The structure of electricity prices in the future is the subject of a great deal of uncertainty. Research (Borenstein 
2005) suggests that allowing prices to vary by time of day, even for a small subset of electricity consumers, could 
substantially lower the costs of supplying electricity, particularly during peak periods, by reducing demand for at 
least some customers. Ruth et al. (2008) find similar outcomes with respect to improvements in the efficiency in the 
end use of electricity. Even if these improvements occur in a subset of households and establishments, all customers 
benefit through a reduction in the retail electricity price.  Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
9 
to changes in electricity price and the nature of that responsiveness, or price-elasticity, varies by 
customer class and over time with less sensitivity in the short run and more sensitivity in the 
long-run as consumers have time to change their electricity using equipment in response to 
changes in electricity price. Simplified demand elasticities are used in this study, as reported in 
Table 2.  
Table 1. Inputs to the Haiku Model and Data Sources 
Variables Source 
Existing Generators    
Capacity EIA 
Heat Rate  EIA 
Fixed and Variable O&M Cost  FERC\EIA\EPA 
Existing Pollution Controls  EPA\EIA\RFF 
Planned Pollution Controls  RFF 
Baseline Emission Rates EPA  (CEMS/NEEDS) 
Scheduled and Unscheduled Outage Rates  NERC GADS data 
New Generators   
Capacity EIA\EPA\Proprietary 
Heat Rate  EIA\EPA\Proprietary 
Fixed and Variable Operating Cost  EIA\EPA\Proprietary 
Capital Cost  EIA\EPA\Proprietary 
Outage Rates  EIA\EPA\Proprietary 
Fuel Supply    
Wellhead Supply Curve for Natural Gas  Interpolated based on EIA 
Delivery Cost for Natural Gas  EIA (AEO 2007) 
Minemouth Supply Curve for Coal  EIA (AEO 2007) 
Delivery Cost for Coal  EIA (AEO 2007) 
Delivered Oil Price  EIA (AEO 2007) 
Pollution Controls   
SO2 – cost and performance  EPA 
NOx  – cost and performance  EPA 
Hg – cost and performance  EPA 
Transmission   
Interregional Transmission Capacity  NERC 
Inter and Intraregional Transmission Costs  EMF 
Inter and Intraregional Transmission Losses  EMF 
Demand   
Demand Level (by season and customer 
class) 
EIA 
Load Duration Curve  RFF  
Demand Growth (by customer class and 
region) 
EIA (AEO 2007) 
Demand Elasticity (by customer class)  Estimated by RFF Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
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Figure 4. Haiku Market Regions and Electricity Pricing  
 
 
Table 2. Demand Elasticities in the Haiku Model 
  Residential Commercial  Industrial 
Short-Run  -0.167 -0.118 -0.110 
Long-Run  -0.649 -0.651 -0.605 
Each year is subdivided into three seasons (summer, winter, and spring-fall) and each 
season into four time blocks (superpeak, peak, shoulder, and base). For each time block, demand 
is modeled for three customer classes (residential, industrial, and commercial). Supply is 
represented using model plants that are aggregated according to their technology and fuel source 
from the complete set of commercial electricity generation plants in the country. Investment in 
new generation capacity and the retirement of existing facilities is determined by the model in a 
framework that takes into account capacity-related costs of providing service in the future 
(“going forward costs”) and future electricity prices that are assumed to be known today. 
Operation of the electricity system (generator dispatch) in the model is based on the 
minimization of short-run variable costs of generation, including fuel costs, variable operating Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
12 
and maintenances cost and the costs of operating pollution control equipment plus the 
opportunity costs of using emissions allowances for those emissions subject to a cap-and-trade 
program. 
Equilibrium in interregional power trading is identified as the level of trading of 
electricity between regions necessary to make marginal generation costs within each region net 
of transmission costs and power losses equal across neighboring regions. These interregional 
transactions are constrained by the level of the available interregional transmission capability as 
reported by the North American Electric Reliability Council (2003a, 2003b).12 Factor prices, 
such as the cost of capital and labor, are held constant across different simulations of the model. 
Fuel prices for coal and natural gas vary according to the level of demand, and are 
benchmarked to the forecasts of the Annual Energy Outlook 2007 for both level and elasticity 
of supply (U.S. EIA 2007a). Coal is differentiated along several dimensions, including fuel 
quality and content and location of supply; and both coal and natural gas prices are differentiated 
by point of delivery. The price of biomass fuel also varies by region depending on the mix of 
biomass types available and delivery costs. Other fuel prices are specified exogenously (i.e. they 
do not change within the model). 
Emissions caps in the Haiku model, such as the Title IV cap on national SO2 emissions 
initiated under the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments, EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) 
caps on emissions of SO2 and NOx  (70 Fed. Reg. at 25,165), the Clean Air Mercury Rule 
(CAMR)  (70 Fed. Reg. at 28,606) and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) cap on 
CO2 emissions (RGGI 2005), are imposed as constraints on the sum of emissions across all 
covered generation sources in the relevant region.13 Emissions of CO2 from individual sources 
                                                 
12 Some of the HMRs are not coterminous with North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) regions and, 
therefore, NERC data cannot be used to parameterize transmission constraints. Haiku assumes no transmission 
constraints among OHMI, KVWV, and IN. NER and NEO are also assumed to trade power without constraints. The 
transmission constraints among the regions ENTN, VACAR, and AMGF, as well as those among MAACR, MD, 
and PA, are derived from version 2.1.9 of the Integrated Planning Model (U.S. EPA 2005). Additionally, starting in 
2014,  the incremental transfer capability associated with two new 500-KV transmission lines into and, in one case, 
through Maryland, which are modeled after a line proposed by Allegheny Electric Power and one proposed by 
PEPCO Holdings are included (Ruth et al. 2008). The transmission capability between Long Island and PJM made 
possible by the Neptune line that began operation in 2007 is also included. 
13 CAIR was vacated by a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit on July 11, 2008 in 
State of North Carolina, et al. v. EPA, and its status is uncertain. Legislative proposals have surfaced in the U.S. 
Congress that would introduce CAIR in statute. 
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depend on emission rates, which vary by type of fuel and technology, and total fuel use at the 
facility.  
The sum of these emissions across all sources must be no greater than the total number of 
allowances available, including those issued for the current year and any unused allowances from 
previous years when banking, or holding of unused allowances from one year for use in future 
years, is permitted. To determine the rate at which the size of the allowance bank (i.e. the amount 
of cumulated unused emission allowances from past years) changes, the model imposes a 
Hotelling-type constraint that requires the rate of increase in the price of a durable asset such as 
emissions allowances from year to year to be no greater than the interest rate (Hotelling 1931). 
This constraint means that investments in emission allowances are assumed to compete with 
investment in other financial assets that grow in value over time at the rate of interest.  
For this project California is disaggregated into two separate HMRs, CALN and CALS 
(N and S stand for north and south) to allows for a more accurate representation of power 
transmission congestion for cross-state trades – see Figure 4. The state is split by matching 
individual plants to local distribution companies (LDCs) using the EPA’s National Electric 
Energy Data System (NEEDS) (U.S. EPA 2006) and to service areas using EIA forms 860 A and 
B. Plants are then assigned to a region based on the location of the LDC or service area. The 
amount of transmission capacity between the two regions is constrained to 3700 MW, which is 
the transfer capability reported for the EPA Base Case 2006 Integrated Planning Model. 
3.2 Baseline Scenario and the AB32 CO2 Cap  
The analysis of the AB32 policy using the Haiku model is performed with reference to a 
baseline scenario. The baseline is designed to simulate the electricity sector in California (and 
beyond) in the absence of AB32 implementation. For this project, a baseline scenario is 
constructed that incorporates all major federal legislation governing airborne emissions from the 
electricity sector including the Title IV cap on national SO2 emissions and CAIR  for SO2 
emissions, the annual and ozone seasons caps on emissions of NOx under CAIR, and CAMR for 
mercury emissions. Also included are some state level legislation, including RGGI, and other 
policies that are specific to individual states. For nuclear capacity additions, Haiku uses the 
regional output of the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Energy Modeling System 
(NEMS) model Annual Energy Outlook for 2007 (U.S. EIA 2007a) as capacity limits on new 
construction of nuclear plants. All of these potential capacity additions are east of the Mississippi 
River. Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
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The baseline scenario assumptions that are most important for California relate to the 
Federal Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit (REPTC) and state level Renewable Portfolio 
Standards (RPS) in several western states, including California. The REPTC provides a 
production tax credit of $19/MWh to new wind, geothermal, and dedicated biomass generators, 
and a credit of $9.50/MWh is available to new landfill gas and non-dedicated biomass 
generators.  
Since the federal REPTC has repeatedly been renewed just prior to lapsing and has 
actually lapsed three times before being reinstituted, it is modeled in perpetuity in Haiku as a tax 
credit that is received with 90 percent probability, to reflect roughly the amount of time that it 
has been in effect since initiated in the early 1990s. The state level RPS mandates within the 
Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) region, including a 20 percent standard that 
is modeled for California, require substantial increases in renewables generation in the coming 
years. The resulting capacity additions are not modeled endogenously within Haiku. Instead, new 
renewable capacity was added in the in order to meet these standards in the western states 
according to forecasts provided by Energy and Environmental Economics, Inc (E3, 2008).14 
These forecasts of renewable resource additions that E3 forecasts would be needed to meet RPS 
standards are built by assumption in our analysis.  
In order to model the effects of the AB32 policy, this study specifies the level of the cap 
on CO2 emissions from electricity generators in California that will be stipulated under the AB32 
policy, or, in the case of a broader-based cap-and-trade policy, an emissions level that reflects the 
level of reductions expected from the electricity sector. The exact parameters for the cap-and-
trade policy have not been decided yet, but the economywide CO2 reduction target for 2020 is 
about 25 percent below the anticipated 2020 business-as-usual level. Preliminary modeling and 
reading of research at the California agencies indicates that reductions required from the 
electricity sector in 2020 will be closer at least 30 percent under a cost-effective implementation 
of the policy, compared to the baseline level.  
In the ARB Scoping Plan, the assumption is that the emissions reductions under a host of 
measures complimentary to AB32 (including efficiency and enhanced renewables standards) will 
be roughly 1/3 of expected baseline emissions and that the cap and trade program will yield even 
                                                 
14 The western states where new renewables capacity was forced include California, Arizona, Montana, Colorado, 
New Mexico, Utah, Nevada and Wyoming. Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
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greater reductions than that, bring emissions in the sector down to something between 59 and 94 
million metric tons in 2020 (CARB 2008). In this analysis the assumed emissions reductions of 
30 percent below the baseline, which includes a continued production tax credit for renewables 
generation and thus lower CO2 emissions than the CEC baseline, will yield total annual 
emissions from the electricity sector of roughly 64 million tons in 2020. 
Figure 5. Baseline Emissions and the AB32 Cap 
 
 
The cap on California electricity sector CO2 emissions that is used in the simulation 
modeling is phased in over the forecast horizon based on a straight line decline from 1 percent 
below the 2012 baseline level of emissions to 30 percent below the 2020 baseline level in 2020. 
The cap is held constant starting in 2020 until the end of the modeling horizon in 2025. The cap 
encompasses all CO2 emissions associated with California electricity consumption, i.e. emissions 
from CA generators as well as those from out-of-state generators that are derived from CA 
electricity demand are included under the AB32 cap. Figure 4.2-1 shows CA emissions and 
emissions from CA net imports in the baseline scenario. The yellow line indicates the AB32 cap 
levels: 156.4 million tons of CO2 emissions in 2012 and 64.1 million tons in 2020.  
Note that strictly imposing this declining emissions path from 2012 through 2020 (and 
then flat thereafter) precludes the banking of allowances not used in early years of the program 
for use in the future, in order to avoid ambiguities about the compliance target; AB 32 provides 
that the emissions in 2020 will strictly conform to the cap. However, if the program does allow 
for banking of emissions allowances, then the allowance prices that result will tend to be higher 
Net Imported Emissions
California Emissions
AB32 CO2 CapResources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
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than what is predicted in the early years of the program as a bank is built up, and prices will be 
lower in the later years as the bank is drawn down. This price differential occurs because 
banking increases demand for allowances of early vintages that can be used for compliance in 
future years and the existence of the bank reduces allowance scarcity in later years, thus lowering 
the value of allowances with later vintages relative to the “no-banking” case that is modeled. 
Table 3. Baseline CO2 Emissions and Emissions Cap, 2020 
Baseline CO2 Emissions (million tons)   
Total 91.4 
     CA South  17.2 
     CA North  13.9 
     Net Imports   60.2 
Emissions Cap   
 CO2 (million tons)  65.1 
Annual Averages of Assumed Import Emissions Rates (tons/MWh)  
 RA  0.57 
   NWP  0.25 
The model does not include the possibility of purchasing or financing greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions outside of the capped sector to offset emissions within this sector. Some 
use of offsets from other sectors likely to be allowed under the AB 32 program (CARB 2008). 
By not allowing for offsets this analysis is likely overstating the cost of meeting the AB 32 cap.  
The CO2 emissions imported to California are those emissions that are generated outside 
of California to meet electricity demand inside of California. These are projected using an 
incremental emissions rates approach intended to reflect the emissions associated with the 
incremental MWh produced in neighboring states that are generated to serve customers in 
California. The first step in calculating an emission rate for imported power is to perform a 
closed-border subbaseline simulation, which is identical to the baseline except that power trading 
between California and its neighbors is constrained to zero. This subbaseline scenario precludes 
any of California’s power needs from being met by imports to the state. The difference between 
the regular baseline and the closed-border subbaseline provides a measure of the incremental 
CO2 emissions and incremental electricity generation in the NWP and RA regions that result 
from power trading with California.15 The emission rates associated with imports are calculated 
                                                 
15 The NWP region includes the states of Oregon, Washington, Nevada, Utah, Idaho, most of Montana and 
Wyoming. The RA region includes Arizona, Colorado and most of New Mexico. Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
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using seasonal and time-block specific changes in emissions and generation in the two 
neighboring regions and these time-block specific rates are used to find emissions values related 
to imports in subsequent policy simulations. Table 3 shows the average annual values of the 
import emissions rate for NWP and RA, the two regions that trade power directly with 
California. 
An alternative methodology is contained in the California Energy Commission (CEC) 
report “Revised Methodology to Estimate the Generation Resource Mix of California Electricity 
Imports” (Alvarado and Griffin, 2007). The report presents a method described as a marginal 
analysis and sales assessment to assign a generation mix to imported power, and applies the 
method to the year 2005. When a California LSE owns an out-of-state generator or a generator is 
a party to a specific contract with a California LSE, the MWh of generation and its generation 
type are directly assigned to LSEs. The remaining portion of imported power is designated as 
coming from an unspecified source.  
Where similar commitments exist in neighboring regions, or where there are constraints 
on generation in order to serve local load outside of California, the authors assign power from 
specific out-of-state generators to out-of-state LSEs. This approach identifies the resources in the 
neighboring regions that are available to generate power for export from those regions to 
California, and they use information about what facilities are likely to be on the margin at 
various times of day in the Southeast to assign a resource type to the unspecified portion of 
imports.  
In 2005, under this approach, 12 percent of imports were unspecified (suggesting that the 
majority could be assigned to particular generating units) and that 96 percent of that small 
unspecified fraction came from natural gas and 4 percent from coal. In total, over 57 percent of 
the total imports from the Southwest to California come from coal, 28 percent from natural gas 
and 11 percent from nuclear. In the Northwest, a slightly different approach is used, where a 
generation type is attributed to unspecified imports using a sales assessment that identifies the 
overall resource mix of the entity selling power to California or, in some cases, the specific 
source identified by the entity selling power to a purchaser in California. In 2005, 88 percent of 
imports from the Northwest were unspecified (not assigned to a particular generating source) 
with 66 percent of that unspecified total coming from hydropower, 22.1 percent from natural gas, 
8.8 percent from coal, 1.7 percent from nuclear, and 1.4 percent from renewables.  
The results of this study’s methodology are compared for calculating the CO2 emissions 
intensity of imports with the findings from the CEC methodology. To do so, the aggregate CO2 Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
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emissions rates for imported power that are calculated by Alvarado and Griffin for 2005 to the 
four years prior to 2005 are used, assuming the estimated 2005 resource mix holds for all the 
years. Table 4 shows the historical net power imports into California and the associated 
emissions of CO2 estimated using this methodology. These estimates are compared with Haiku 
forecasts for future years developed using this study’s incremental emission rate approach 
described above. The anticipated growth of net imports in the Haiku model estimation is roughly 
consistent with the historic trend. Imports grew about 36 percent between 2001 and 2005, or 5.5 
billion KWh (BkWh) per year, according to CEC. The Haiku model projects a growth rate of 35 
percent between 2010 and 2020, or 4 BkWh per year.  
Table 4. Emissions and Generation Comparison for Electricity Imports 
 
The estimates for total emissions are not as consistent across the two sources and time 
frames. In 2010, the Haiku estimated emissions rate for power imports is 1.07 tons CO2/ MWh, 
about 75 percent higher than the CEC estimated emissions rate for 2005. The difference is 
attributable to the differences in the techniques used to estimate emissions. CEC estimates that 









2001 60 41 0.68
2002 83 47 0.56
2003 81 48 0.59
2004 87 53 0.61









2010 113 121 1.07
2011 114 120 1.05
2012 116 118 1.02
2013 120 108 0.90
2014 124 98 0.79
2015 128 88 0.69
2016 133 83 0.62
2017 138 77 0.56
2018 143 72 0.50
2019 148 66 0.45
2020 153 60 0.39
Estimated from CEC "Revised Methodology to Estimate the 
Generation Resource Mix of California Electricity Imports"
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compared to coal and 28 percent by nuclear, hydro or other renewables, which emit no carbon. 
The CEC’s analysis assumes these suppliers would not be running if the region was not 
exporting power to California but in fact it is unclear which generation resources would be 
utilized less in the absence of demand for power from California.  
Because some of the resources identified by the CEC have low variable cost, such as 
nuclear, hydro and other renewables, it is likely that these facilities would be run to serve 
demand outside California and other facilities with higher fuel costs would be utilized less if 
California were not part of the transmission grid. The Haiku model, on the other hand, calculates 
equilibrium generation capacity, prices, generation, and emissions for the entire region (and 
country) when California is both on and off of the grid. The difference in emissions between 
these two baselines provides a unique way to think about out-of-state incremental generation that 
occurs specifically to meet electricity demand in California.  
Over time the resource mix forecast in Haiku changes. Consequently, the incremental 
emissions rate for imported power drops almost 2/3 between 2010 and 2020 in the Haiku 
projections and approaches the estimate by the CEC for 2005, as illustrated in Table 4. The 
change in Haiku is due to growing renewable capacity throughout the West that includes an 
expansion in renewable generation to meet state RPS standards, and to take advantage of the 
federal Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit, which is assumed to be renewed with a 
probability of 90 percent in each future year (based on the experience in the past with renewal 
and lapses in this policy).  
3.3 Policy Scenarios 
Several different policy scenarios are considered and are defined by two characteristics. 
The first is the geographic scope of the cap-and-trade program, and the second is the approach to 
allocation of emissions allowances.16  The combinations of program scopes and approaches to 
allocation that are modeled are illustrated in Table 5 and described in the next few paragraphs.  
While AB32 is clear that emissions from imported power must be addressed by the 
implementing regulations, exactly how emissions from imports will be treated under a future 
cap-and-trade program is yet to be determined. Also, while California moves ahead with 
developing its approach to implementing AB 32, the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), in which 
                                                 
16 For a discussion of the options and staff analysis see CPUC and CEC, 2008. Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
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California participates, is also moving ahead with developing a regional CO2 cap-and-trade 
program that could be operational in a similar time frame to that proposed in AB32. In light of 
these uncertainties and simultaneous developments, two different approaches to the scope of a 
trading program imposed on the electricity sector were considered, as shown in the column 
headings in Table 5.  
The “California-only” approach is a first-deliverer regulation, with an estimated 
emission intensity assigned to imported power, as described above. Under this scenario, the 
estimated emission rate associated with generation to serve California electricity consumption is 
applied. Although this rate varies with the region from which power is imported and it varies 
over time, it is held constant with respect to changes in the level of imported power identified in 
the simulation. That is, the assumed emission rate is applied equally to all imported power 
coming from a given region in a given year. Importers have to hold sufficient allowances to 
cover their estimated emissions of CO2, as do native generators in California.  
The second program scope is a western regional CO2 cap-and-trade program that 
applies to all electricity generators in the Western Electric Coordinating Council (WECC) 
region. This program scope is a proxy for an electricity focused program under the WCI. Seven 
of the 11 states in the WECC, including California, are full participants in the WCI as are three 
Canadian provinces.17 Under the modified WCI cap-and-trade program that is modeled, it is 
assumed, consistent with WCI plans, that the program will require reductions in emissions from 
electricity generators in the region of 30 percent from baseline levels in 2020.18   




California Only.  Modified WCI Region 
Auction  x x 
Load-Based Allocation  x x 
                                                 
17 The other WECC states plus Alaska and Kansas are official observers to the WCI as are several Mexican states 
and two Canadian provinces. 
18 The WCI regional goal is to achieve a 15 percent reduction below 2005 levels by 2020. The target modeled in this 
study is a 30 percent reduction below the baseline level of emissions predicted in the model for each simulation 
year.  Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
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The two approaches to allowance allocation are summarized in the rows in Table 5. 
These include an allowance auction and allocation to local distribution companies (LDCs) on 
the basis of the size of the population served by the LDC. Under an auction, in-state generators 
and power importers in the California-only scenario must purchase CO2 emission allowances 
from the government and then surrender them to cover their CO2 emissions. Under the allocation 
to LDCs, allowances are allocated for free to LDCs, and generators and importers must purchase 
allowances from the LDCs to whom they have been awarded. The ability to sell allowances that 
it received for free gives the LDCs an additional source of revenue that helps to offset the 
increase in the wholesale price of power associated with the new CO2 price in the economy. This 
revenue lowers the portion of total costs that needs to be recovered from electricity customers. 
As a result, the price of electricity paid by all classes of customers is expected to be lower with 
load-based allocation than with an auction approach.  
Allowance allocation has become an important focus of recent political debates about 
CO2 cap-and-trade programs at the federal level and within Europe as well as in California. Most 
of the arguments in these debates are motivated by concerns about the high potential costs of 
these programs and who will bear them. However, how allowances are allocated can have 
implications for the efficiency of the cap-and-trade program as well. This is particularly true 
within the context of the electricity sector. In many states, including California, this sector is 
subject to cost-of-service regulation, and thus the opportunity cost of freely granted emissions 
allowances (based on some historic measure) will not be reflected in electricity prices the way 
they would be in regions where prices are set in the market (Burtraw et al. 2001).19  
4. Findings from Simulation Analysis 
The electricity market simulation model is used to analyze the effects of allowance 
allocation and geographic scope of the cap-and-trade regulation on electricity markets in 
California and beyond, allowance markets, greenhouse gas emissions, and emissions of 
pollutants that affect local air quality in California. Issues of key concern include the potential 
for emissions leakage and how it is affected by the method of allocation. The study also 
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considers how a key baseline assumption regarding the future of federal policy to promote 
renewables affects the analysis.  













California           
Avg Elec price 




2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
   Natural Gas 
49.4 58.3 69.7 35.2 58.5 
   Nuclear 
34.8 34.8 34.8 34.8 34.8 
   Oil 
6.6 2.3 0.5 5.7 5.7 
   Non‐hydro Renewables 
56.3 75.8 76.0 68.8 71.0 
  Total 
192.3 216.2 226.0 189.6 215.1 
Imports (bill. kWh) 




11.1  12.6  12.6 8.1 10.6 
   Wind 
7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 
   Biomass 
0.0 3.1 3.4 2.0 2.3 
   Geothermal  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.7 
   Total 
21.3 25.8 26.2 20.3 23.1 




20.9 9.8  6.9 10.9  12.8 
  SO2 (thousand tons) 
9.8 8.9 2.2 9.7  10.0 Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
23 
  CO2 (million tons) 
31.1 28.7 29.5 24.1 33.4 
Rest of Westb           
Avg Elec price 
(2004$/MWh) 
72.6 71.3 69.7 80.4 76.1 
TOTAL Gen. (bill. kWh) 
639.5 607.8 611.7 608.6 600.9 
TOTAL Cons. (bill. 
kWh) 
460.8 464.0 466.0 439.9 452.7 
Entire West           
  CO2 Reduction  
(mill. tons)    19.5  14.5  103.4  103.8 
The results of the simulation analysis of the four scenarios are summarized and 
contrasted with those for the baseline scenario in Table 6. This table shows the effects on the 
average electricity price, the mix of fuels used to generate electricity, the amount of imports into 
California, and the effects on investments in new capacity for the year 2020. The table also 
includes projections of allowance prices and emissions of SO2, NOx and CO2 in California under 
the different scenarios. 
4.1 Auction 
The first approach to allocation that is considered is an auction. 
4.1.1 California-Only Cap and Trade 
The imposition of a cap-and-trade program on electricity sector CO2 emissions in 
California-only, using the first-deliverer approach, and with an allowance auction, has important 
effects on electricity prices, electricity imports, and the mix of generators used to produce 
electricity in California. Under the allowance auction case, the average electricity price in 
California in 2020 is 11 percent higher with this policy than under the baseline, and electricity 
demand is 3.7 percent lower. Imports into California are 24 percent lower in 2020 as a result of 
the policy suggesting that the first deliverer approach helps to stem the growing reliance on 
power imports in 2020 that occurs in the baseline scenario. The lower level of demand brought 
about by the policy means that only part of the reduction in imports needs to be made up by 
greater in-state generation, and the resulting increase is comprised of a combination of higher 
generation with natural gas and roughly 50 percent more generation from non-hydro renewables Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
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compared to the baseline. The price of an emission allowance under this policy is $47.20 per ton 
of CO2 in 2020. 
Imposing the California-only policy results in an average electricity price in the regions 
that surround California that is nearly 2 percent lower than in the baseline scenario in 2020.20 
The decline in retail prices outside of California contributes to emissions leakage (see below). 
The usual rationale for leakage is that generation outside the regulated region increases to meet 
demand in the regulated region. Hence, an increase in consumption outside the regulated region 
is not the usual rationale for leakage.  
4.1.2 Leakage and Grid Usage 
Emissions leakage is a concern for policies intended to restrict emissions of greenhouse 
gases. Because climate change is a global problem, the location of CO2 emissions does not 
matter, and if efforts to reduce emissions in one location lead to increases in another, the 
effectiveness of the policy is reduced. Concerns about leakage have confounded efforts to control 
emissions of CO2 within the U.S. because of the lack of such commitments on the part of trading 
partners including China and India, countries that could also become magnets for industries 
seeking to avoid regulations in the US and Europe.  
Concerns about leakage also plague regional programs within the U.S., the largest and 
most developed of which is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) that caps emissions 
of CO2 from electricity generators in 10 northeastern states beginning in 2009. Estimates of 
leakage under this program range substantially: Burtraw et al. (2005) reported leakage estimates 
of between 17 and 40 percent of emissions reductions brought about by the program over a 
decade of operation when allowing for investments in new capacity, while Chen and Sauma 
(2008) found that, in the short run, leakage from RGGI could be closer to 70 to over 90 percent 
of CO2 emissions reductions in the RGGI region. 
                                                 
20  It is not obvious what expectations about the effect of this policy on prices in neighboring regions would be ex 
ante. Retail prices in the regions neighboring California are assumed to be regulated at approximate average cost, 
and inter-regional trade is determined by differences in the marginal generation cost between neighboring regions. 
Revenue from exported power is assumed to accrue to ratepayers in the exporting region thereby lowering the 
revenue requirement in the region that has to be recovered from native customers; therefore, an increase in exports 
should lower native retail price. However, if marginal generation cost in an exporting region is not increasing as  the 
level of generation increases, then the retail (average) cost in the exporting region may rise as long as it is below 
marginal cost. Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
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In a study of what the RGGI states might do about leakage, the RGGI Emissions Leakage 
Multi-State Staff Working Group (2008) stresses the possibility of a national plan as a way of 
addressing the leakage problem. They conclude that RGGI states should monitor leakage and 
implement leakage mitigation measures with demonstrated effectiveness and short 
implementation time frames. Examples of these are aggressive increases in investment in energy 
efficiency market transformation programs and complementary policies such as building energy 
codes and appliance and equipment efficiency standards that accelerate the deployment of end-
use energy efficiency technologies and measures. The report recommends against using policies 
such as emissions portfolio standards and load-based compliance requirement at the current time, 
but recognizes that these and other measures are deserving of future study because they could be 
useful if end-use energy efficiency measures prove insufficient as a leakage mitigation approach 
or action toward the implementation of a federal cap-and-trade program is significantly delayed. 
Initially there will be no explicit accounting for the change in emissions that might occur out of 
the region in order to provide power to consumers in the region. 
In the case of the California-only policy, emissions leakage was measured as the change 
in CO2 emissions in the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) region that offset the 
reductions required under the California policy, which is equal to 26.2 million tons in CO2 
emissions reductions in 2020. Emissions leakage can come from growth in power imports into 
California as a result of the policy, or from changes in the generation mix or electricity 
consumption in the neighboring regions. 
Emissions leakage from demand for imports is constrained by the capacity of the 
electricity transmission grid between California and it neighbors. The Haiku model imposes an 
exogenous growth rate for interregional transmission capability of 1.5 percent per year, which 
could come from new or expanded lines or software upgrades. If the transmission constraint is 
met in 2020, such that California maximizes its net power imports, then using the emission rate 
calculated from the baseline, those imports would account for 65.5 million tons of CO2 emissions 
in NWP and RA. Under the state-wide cap, emissions associated with imports to California will 
fall to around 36.5 million tons of CO2, or approximately 56 percent of the maximum potential. 
The “Grid in Use (%)” row of Table 7 shows this metric for each of the scenarios. 
This study’s findings with respect to total emissions leakage are summarized in Table 7 
in the row labeled “Leakage (%)”. This measure of leakage is calculated as the change in total 
emissions in the WECC relative to the baseline, divided by the emissions reduction goal of the 
policy (26.2 M tons of CO2 in 2020). Any changes in CO2 emissions beyond the WECC are 
ignored by this measurement of leakage. These results suggest that leakage will depend on how Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
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allowances are allocated. Under an auction, leakage would offset roughly 25 percent of the 
emissions reductions resulting from the program. 
Table 7. Emissions Measures, 2020  
 
 
The California-only scenarios impose an assumed emission rate on generation in NWP 
and RA of 0.25 tons/MWh and 0.57 tons/MWh, respectively. These emission rates are derived, 
as described in Section 4.2, from the difference between the baseline scenario and a subbaseline 
in which no power is traded between California and its neighbors. The bottom section of Table 7 
shows these baseline emission rates, as well as the emissions rates associated with incremental 
generation in neighboring regions that obtain under each scenario.21 When the emission rate 
varies from that calculated from the baseline scenarios, it indicates a change in the overall 
composition of the resource mix. In the model solution for the auction scenario, the imports from 
                                                 







CO2 Emissions [M tons]
   CA               31.1                       28.7                      29.5 
   NWP            125.6                     122.8                    128.2 
   RA             188.2                     174.0                    172.9 
      WECC Total             345.0                     325.5                     330.5 
Policy Reductions Goal [M tons]                      26.2                       26.2 
Policy Reductions [M tons]
   CA                        2.5                        1.7 
   NWP                        2.8                       (2.6)
   RA                      14.2                      15.4 
      WECC Total                     19.5                      14.4 
Leakage [%] 26% 45%
Grid in Use [%] 92% 56% 54%
CO2 Emissions Rate of Exports to CA [tons/MWh]
   NWP              0.25   ------                      0.45 
   RA               0.57                       0.44                      0.46 Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
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RA have an emission intensity that is roughly comparable to that assumed in the model. There is 
very little incremental generation from NWP, and the emission rate is unchanged. 
4.1.3 The Modified WCI Policy 
One way to address the CO2 emissions leakage problem would be to expand the cap-and-
trade program to cover a larger geographic region. A West-wide cap-and-trade program was 
modeled with modified WCI scenarios, one with an auction approach to initial allocation and one 
with load-based allocation. The modified WCI policy imposes a 30 percent reduction in CO2 
emissions from baseline levels in 2020, with a gradual decline in the emissions cap from 2012 
until 2020, and then holds the cap at the 2020 level in subsequent years. 
In addition to limiting leakage, a region-wide cap would yield a substantially lower CO2 
allowance price and a smaller increase in electricity price in California than a California-only 
policy. When the regional policy is combined with an allowance auction, the CO2 allowance 
price is $17.20 per ton in 2020, slightly more than 1/3 of the allowance price level with a 
California-only policy. Electricity price in California rises by 3.2 percent in 2020, again about 
1/3 as much as it does with a California-only cap and an auction.  
Moving from a state-specific policy to region-wide CO2 emissions cap has important 
implications for power trading and what resources are used to generate power in California. 
Because the broader regional cap is a source-based policy, there is no compliance requirement on 
power importers and that results in a much smaller drop in power imports into California as a 
result of the cap. With a modified WCI policy coupled with an allowance auction, power imports 
to California are only slightly lower than baseline levels. However, natural gas-fired generation 
within California is about 30 percent lower under the policy than in the baseline, and investment 
in new natural gas capacity is below baseline levels. Oil-fired generation within California, 
which falls dramatically under a California-only policy, only declines slightly under the WCI 
policy. 
As expected, the region-wide policy has larger effects on California’s neighbors than 
would a California-only policy. Average electricity price in the rest of the West increases more 
than 10 percent from baseline levels, and total consumption falls by 5 percent when the modified 
WCI policy is coupled with an auction. Total generation in the regions surrounding California 
falls by a comparable amount. The largest change is a reduction of 64 BkWh in coal-fired 
generation and a decline of 29 BkWh in gas generation, while renewable generation increases by 
56 BkWh.  Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
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4.2 Load-Based Allocation  
When allowances are auctioned to those entities that need them for compliance with the 
cap-and-trade regulation, the costs of those allowances are fully reflected in the price of 
electricity to consumers in California, and, under the California-only policy that is modeled, an 
11 percent increase in price is seen. One way to reduce the price impact of the policy would be to 
allocate allowances to LDCs, the regulated companies responsible for the wires that facilitate 
delivery of power to final consumers. Power generators and first deliverers of imported power 
would be required to purchase allowances from the LDCs, or alternatively allowances could be 
auctioned centrally with the revenues being returned to the LDCs. This approach provides 
another source of revenue to these regulated companies, which allows them to lower what they 
charge customers for electricity.22   
Allocation to LDCs may be done on the basis of several different metrics including 
population, electricity demand and even emissions.23  For this analysis, a population-based 
approach was used. Relative to a consumption-based approach, the population-based approach 
rewards past investment in energy efficiency and efforts to keep consumption per person low. 
California may view a consumption-based approach as especially perverse, given the state’s 
previous and ongoing efforts to reduce energy consumption. An emissions based approach would 
be difficult to implement in California, given the near impossibility of assigning allowances to 
imported power, an important source of electricity related CO2 emissions. 
The load-based approach to allocation substantially attenuates the effect of the cap-and-
trade policies on average retail electricity price in California. As shown in Table 6, under the 
                                                 
22 An alternative approach would be to refund the allowance revenue to consumers on a per capita or per household 
basis. This approach, known as cap and dividend, would help to lower the impact of the greenhouse gas cap and 
trade policy on electricity consumers, but would do so in a way that would not affect the price they pay for 
electricity. As such its effects on electricity markets and allowance markets would be identical to the auction based 
approach discussed in section 5.1. 
23 In each of these approaches to load-based allocation, the allowances are distributed to the local distribution 
companies and revenue from the sale of these allowances (received at zero cost) are assumed to be used to partially 
offset the revenue requirement of the LDC, thus allowing it to lower its price for distributing electricity and, in the 
case when the LDC is also the load-serving entity, for supplying the electricity to customers. Load-based allocation 
could take the form of allocating allowances directly to LDCs, which would then be responsible for seeing them, or 
it could take the form of holding a single allowance auction and then allocating the revenues from that auction to 
LDCs based on one of the measures identified. An emissions-based approach to load-based allocation has been 
endorsed by the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (April 21, 2008). See Paul et al (2008) 
for a discussion of the implications of different approaches to load-based allocation of allowances under a national 
CO2 cap and trade program. Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
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California-only policy, the electricity price increase in 2020 with load-based allocation would be 
only 6 percent compared to a more than 11 percent increase under the auction. The lower 
electricity price means electricity demand would be higher. This is partially met by more 
generation from natural gas plants within California, but it also has a positive effect on leakage, 
compared to the auction scenario. Table 7 indicates that there is little difference in the emission 
rate that is associated with imports from RA. However, there is a significant difference in the 
emission rate associated with incremental generation from NWP, where the emission rate is 
greater than that assumed in the model. 
The lower electricity price does come at a cost. The policy would yield a more than 100 
percent increase in the price of CO2 emission allowances in 2020. With a smaller increase in 
electricity price, electricity consumers have a weaker incentive to conserve electricity, which 
means that there will be more demand for the fixed quantity of emission allowances, thus driving 
up their price. This has implications for other parts of the California economy as well, as 
discussed below. 
Under the Modified WCI policy, the load-based approach to allocation actually would 
reduce electricity price in California to a level 2 percent below baseline price. This result reflects 
the fact that California is the most populous state within the Western states region and thus, 
under a population-based approach to load-based allocation, LDCs in California get a substantial 
share of the value of the emissions allowances created by the program. The lower price means 
that total electricity demand in California would be higher than baseline levels and more 
generation from renewables and natural gas fired generators would be brought on to fill the gap 
on the supply side. As shown in the bottom section of Table 6, the average electricity price in the 
rest of the West would be higher than baseline levels, but lower than the price obtained if an 
auction was used to implement the Modified WCI policy. 
While the effect of load-based allocation on allowance price is much less pronounced 
with the Modified WCI than it is with the California-only policy, allowance price would still be 
24 percent higher than under the auction. Thus, using this approach to compensate electricity 
consumers for the cost of a climate policy will come at a cost that will be felt beyond the 
electricity sector by all parties who must hold allowances to cover their CO2 emissions. 
4.3 Ancillary Benefits in California 
Some concerns about a cap-and-trade approach in California stem from the fear that 
allowing firms to trade CO2 emissions could result in increases in emissions of pollutants, such Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
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as NOx and SO2, that have local air quality effects and that these increases might be particularly 
damaging to low-income populations that tend to live in closer proximity to fossil-fueled 
electricity generators and other industrial facilities. This study’s results suggest that a cap-and-
trade program for CO2 emissions in California will typically result in substantially lower 
emissions of NOx from the electricity sector. Impacts on SO2 emissions are mixed and vary 
across scenarios as shown earlier in the summary table.  
Table 8 shows emissions of NOx and SO2 under the different scenarios separately for the 
northern and southern regions of California. Emissions of NOx fall in both the northern and 
southern parts of the state when CO2 cap-and-trade policies are imposed. In Northern California, 
the drop in NOx emissions is greater with a California-only policy than with the Modified WCI 
policy, assuming a common approach to initial allocation. The lowest level of NOx emissions in 
both regions occurs under a California-only policy with a load-based approach to allocation. This 
study’s model does not include the effects of local air quality restrictions on emissions of these 
pollutants nor does it reflect reductions required by the RECLAIM program.  









Northern California           
NOx (thousand tons)  10.3 4.9 3.5 6.4 6.9
SO2 (thousand tons)  7.3 6.3 1.2 7.2  7.3
Southern California           
NOx (thousand tons)  10.6 5.0 3.4 4.5 5.9
SO2 (thousand tons)  2.4 2.6 1.1 2.5 2.6
Total California     
NOx (thousand tons)  20.9 9.9 6.9 10.9  12.8
SO2 (thousand tons)  9.8 8.9 2.3 9.7 9.9
Overall, the CO2 policies have much less pronounced effects on emissions of SO2 from 
California electricity generators. The one exception to this is the California-only policy with 
load-based allocation, which results in an over 80 percent reduction in SO2 emissions from Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
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electricity in the northern part of the state in 2020 and a more than 50 percent reduction in the 
south. This is the same scenario that produced dramatic reductions in emission of NOx, and these 
reductions follow from the decline in oil-fired generation resulting from this policy. With a CO2 
emission allowance price in excess of $100 per ton, generating electricity with oil becomes 
prohibitively expensive. In the study’s model, oil generators, generally deemed necessary to 
meet load in load pockets, have a strong incentive to run even at high levels of costs, but the 
allowance cost in this scenario more than offsets that incentive. In the real world, it is unclear the 
extent to which the generation services provided by must-run oil generators in California may be 
supplied by other resources. 
In general, the results indicate that CO2 cap-and-trade policies would not lead to NOx or 
SO2 emissions increases statewide, although there are slight increases in the southern part of the 
state under certain policies. 
4.4 Alternative Renewables Policy Assumptions in the Baseline 
The assumption that the federal REPTC will remain in effect in 9 out of 10 years for the 
indefinite future has an important effect on the amount of renewable generation in the future 
predicted by the model. This effect was analyzed by running an alternative baseline that excludes 
the extension of the REPTC policy into the future. As shown in Table 9, at the national level 
including the REPTC policy results in more than double the amount of non-hydro renewables 
generation in 2020 as occurs without the REPTC and 5 percent lower CO2 emissions from the 
electricity sector as a whole. The REPTC also results in a slightly lower average electricity price 
and slightly more electricity consumption nationwide, which helps to limit the reduction in CO2 
emissions brought about by the REPTC policy.24 
The effects in the western US outside California are more pronounced than those 
nationwide as shown in Table 10. In the two regions that border California, the policy has a 
dramatic effect on the role of non-hydro renewables generation, in large part because of the 
abundance of wind resources located in the NWP region. Total generation by non-hydro 
renewables is 125 percent higher and total CO2 emissions from the electricity sector are nearly 
12 percent lower in 2020 when the REPTC policy is extended than when it is not. When the 
REPTC is not extended, the generation mix in the combined regions bordering California is more 
                                                 
24 Palmer and Burtraw (2005) also find that a production tax credit on renewables is not a cost-effective way to 
reduce CO2 emissions because it results in lower electricity prices and higher electricity consumption. Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
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heavily weighted toward coal and natural gas, and the amount of power shipped into California is 
reduced. 
Interestingly, in California eliminating the federal REPTC does not result in less non-
hydro renewables generation. Instead, as a result of both the renewables that are brought on-line 
in California to help meet the 20 percent RPS policy and the fact that California would have to 
pay more for imported power without the REPTC, there would be roughly the same amount of 
non-hydro renewables generation within the state without the federal tax credit as with the 
federal tax credit for renewables. Without the REPTC, California does increase its reliance on 
fossil generators because importing power is more expensive. This increase in fossil generation, 
in turn leads to an increase in CO2 emissions from in-state electricity generators of roughly 16.6 
percent.  
Figure 5 shows the time path of baseline CO2 emissions from California generators and 
importers in the absence of the REPTC. Without the REPTC, baseline emissions actually rise 
slightly between 2010 and 2020, with all of the increase coming from emissions associated with 
power imports. Without the REPTC, the mix of generators that are used to produce power for 
export to California tend to be much higher emitting, with an average emission rate of roughly 
0.8 tons per MWh. A CO2 emissions cap in 2020 set on the basis of this baseline would be 
higher, but exactly how the price of allowances would be affected is difficult to predict given 
that having the REPTC in place lowers the cost of compliance with the cap. Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
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Avg Elec price (2004$/MWh) 81.4 82.9 
Generation (billion kWh)   
   Coal  2,221.4 2,308.1 
   Natural Gas  681.6 786.2 
   Nuclear  831.7 837.3 
   Oil  71.1 79.2 
   Non‐hydro Renewables  456.7 216.5 
  Total  4,575.0 4,539.7 
Emissions    
   CO2 (million tons)  2,805.0 2,947.9 
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California      Rest of West     
Avg Elec price 






   Coal  2.7  2.7    Coal  252.4 295.6
   Natural Gas  49.4  61.1    Natural Gas  50.1 55.2
   Nuclear  34.8  34.8    Nuclear  39.5 39.5
   Oil  6.6  6.8    Oil  0.8 1.6
   Non‐hydro 
Renewables  56.3  57.1
   Non‐hydro Renewables 
122.6 54.2
  Total  192.3  204.9   Total  639.5 620.3
Imports (billion kWh)  152.6  134.7 Imports (billion kWh) -149.9 -133.8
New Capacitya (GW)     New Capacitya (GW)   
   Gas  11.1  10.1    Gas  13.8 13.8
   Wind  7.6  7.6    Wind  23.6 13.8
   Biomass  0.0  0.0    Biomass  0.0  0.0 
   Geothermal 
1.7  1.7    Geothermal  4.4  3.5 
   Total  21.3  20.3     Total  48.7 36.4
Emissions     Emissions   
  NOx (thousand tons)  20.9  24.4   NOx (thousand tons)  537.0 568.2
  SO2 (thousand tons)  9.8  10.5   SO2 (thousand tons)  294.2 298.1
   CO2 (million tons)  31.1  36.1    CO2 (million tons)  313.8 356.4
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5. Conclusion 
An important challenge in designing a CO2 allowance cap-and-trade program for 
implementing AB32 in California is how to allocate the CO2 emission allowances created by the 
program. This decision will have important implications not only for the performance and 
effectiveness of the California program, but also for how that program helps to inform and shape 
a future federal economywide cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gases. 
One approach that we modeled would keep the allowance value associated with historic 
emissions of CO2 in the electricity sector by directing the value to local distribution companies, 
thereby subsidizing electricity consumption. An alternative approach would be to use allowance 
auctions with auction revenue available to be used for a variety of purposes. This study’s results 
suggest that using a load-based approach to allocation within the electricity sector will cause 
greater marginal costs of emissions reduction in other sectors of the economy, raise total costs 
across the economy, and undermine the environmental initiative through emissions leakage. 
The extent of emissions leakage in a California-only cap-and-trade program depends 
importantly on how emissions allowances are allocated. A load-based approach to allocation, 
with its relatively smaller effect on electricity price, leads to nearly twice as much emissions 
leakage as an auction approach. Expanding the scope of the cap-and-trade program to include all 
western states would eliminate leakage of emissions within the region and produce substantially 
more in CO2 reductions at a lower allowance price. Also, contrary to the expectations of some 
stakeholders, simulation modeling indicates a cap-and-trade policy for CO2 would reduce 
emissions of NOx in the electricity sector. 
Minimizing the politically unpopular effect on price has been an explicit objective of 
many advocates. The practical design of public policy success requires a transition in the 
changes in relative prices in the economy. This will lessen the cost of the program by lessening 
the economic disruptions associated with an abrupt change in policy.  
If policymakers remain wedded indefinitely to an electricity price that does not reflect the 
scarcity value of CO2 while other sectors of the economy are treated differently, then the 
marginal cost of emissions reductions will differ across the economy, potentially greatly 
increasing the cost to the economy of emissions reductions. It will also undermine consumer 
decisions with respect to investments in end-use efficiency because electricity will be priced 
below its marginal social cost.  Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
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Glossary 
AB32   Assembly Bill 32 
ARB   Air Resources Board 
CAIR   Clean Air Interstate Rule 
CAMR   Clean Air Mercury Rule  
CCAR   California Climate Action Registry 
CEC   California Energy Commission  
CO2 Carbon  Dioxide 
CO2RC   CO2 Reduction Credit 
CPUC   California Public Utilities Commission 
DOE   U.S. Department of Energy 
E3   Energy and Environmental Economics 
EIA   U.S. Energy Information Administration 
EPA   U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
GEAC   Generation emission attribution certificate 
HMR   Haiku market region 
ISO   Independent System Operator 
IOU   Investor owned utility 
LDC   Local distribution company 
LSE   Load Serving Entity 
NEEDS   National Electric Energy Data System 
NEMS   National Energy Modeling System 
NERC   North American Electric Reliability Council 
NOx   Nitrogen Oxides 
NWP   the northwestern subregion of the Western Electricity Coordinating Council  
PIER   Public Interest Energy Research 
RA   the southwestern subregion of the Western Electricity Coordinating Council 
RD&D   Research, development and demonstration 
REPTC   Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit 
RGGI   Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
RPS   Renewable Portfolio Standard 
SO2   Sulfur Dioxide 
TEPPC   Transmission Expansion Planning Policy Committee 
WCI   Western Climate Initiative 
WECC   Western Electricity Coordinating Council Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, and Paul 
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